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INTRODUCTION 
Tbilisi’s recent foreign and security policies should present analysts working 
from conventional balance-of-power perspectives with something of a puzzle.  
With direct neighbor Russia very much the regionally dominant power, against 
the predictions of most structural-systemic theories (Jervis 1978, 172-73; 
Waltz 1979, 113; Wolfers 1962, 13-16), small state Georgia has ended up 
balancing against, rather than bandwagoning with Moscow, apparently 
disregarding a major structural constraint to its foreign and security policies.  
In addition, this pro-Western orientation has shown remarkable continuity: it 
has persisted even after the country’s defeat in the August 2008 war, and 
one-time ‘fellow traveler’ Ukraine’s descent into conflict.  Georgia’s post-
Saakashvili government has, for all its opposition to its predecessor’s 
domestic policies, promised to continue Georgia’s path toward NATO and EU 
integration, even as it has made a priority of improving relations with Moscow 
(Civil Georgia 2012; How to Treat Russia. 2014). 
 
As a result, Georgia’s pro-Western stance has usually been explained through 
reference to domestic factors, including ideology and identity.  One early work 
looked at Tbilisi’s policies in terms of Georgians’ religious, European, and 
pan-Caucasian self-identifications (Jones 2003).  Tsygankov and Tarver-
Wahlquist (2009) analyzed the troubled Georgian-Russian relationship from 
the symbolic perspective of ‘honor’ and ‘prestige’. Domestic explanations – 
economic, ideological – have also predominated in a collected volume on the 
subject (Kakachia and Cecire 2013) and a more recent monograph by 
Mouritzen and Wivel (2013), while in their recent article, Gvalia, Siroky, 
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Lebanidze and Iashvili (2013) have described the post-2003 elite’s ideological 
world-views as underlying their Westernizing domestic and foreign policies.  
This contemporary dominance of Innenpolitik explanations of the foreign 
policy behavior of not just Georgia, but other small states appears to 
contradict realism’s insistence on their relative passivity: for realists, due to 
their severely limited capabilities, smaller polities are condemned to conform 
to external structural, power-political realities, at the risk of engaging in the 
ultimate realist vice - of imprudence (Fendius Elman 1995; Hey 2003; Waltz 
1979, 194-5).   
 
While Georgia’s behavior may contradict many of the theories concerned with 
the balance-of-power, disregarding outside realities in response would 
therefore appear to offer a very partial - and implausible - view of Tbilisi’s 
motivations.  There is no doubt that the ideational propensities of subsequent 
Georgian leaders were instrumental in shaping Georgian foreign policy; but 
such specific domestic, ideological factors can only tell part of the story. For 
instance – and somewhat weakening Gvalia and others’ stand-alone 
ideological explanations - Tbilisi’s journey towards the West had started well 
before the ideologically charged Rose Revolution, under pragmatist Eduard 
Shevardnadze: while having improved relations with Russia during the first 
years of his presidency, post-Soviet Georgia’s pragmatic second president 
already oversaw fast-growing ties with the West from 1996 onwards, often in 
direct contravention of Russian interests.1  This element of continuity despite 
of Shevardnadze’s and Saakashvili’s dramatically different world-views – and 
the fact that the Western turn occurred during, not after, the former’s tenure - 
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suggests something more than simple ideological preference as the sole 
explanatory factor. 
 
This essay will aim to re-validate the relevance of structural, power-political 
factors in understanding Georgia’s foreign-policy behavior by analyzing its 
interactions with Russia and the West from a neoclassical realist theoretical 
viewpoint (Lobell and Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009; Rose 1998).  It 
represents a departure from the pure ‘Innenpolitik’ approaches so prevalent in 
analyses of Georgian, and, in fact, small-state foreign policies in general.  But 
it only does so to a limited extent: contrary to its predecessor theory – 
neorealism – neoclassical realism does not constrain itself to the international 
level of power-political interaction, thereby providing explanations as to 
systemic outcomes based only on particular configurations of power (with the 
prediction that small states will bandwagon with dominant states as a prime 
example).  Instead, it sees state behavior as the result of an anarchic 
international environment whose relative distributions of power are mediated 
through domestic conditions (Sterling-Folker 1997).  As such, it thus takes 
neorealism beyond Waltz’ (1979) and his direct successors’ parsimony and 
rigid structuralism; rather than assuming the ‘functional identity’ of units, it 
distinguishes between a range of internally generated motives and limiting 
factors that may affect their foreign policies. Here, states remain constrained 
by the structure of anarchy, but exact policy outcomes are subject to varying 
priorities determined from within the state: in Rose’s words, there is no 
“perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy 
behavior” (Rose 1998, 146-47). 
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As I shall argue in the next, conceptual section, with certain caveats for 
Georgia’s position as a small state within the international system, the 
neoclassical refinement to neorealism provides a much more comprehensive 
and coherent view of Tbilisi’s behavior since 1992 than exclusively domestic 
approaches.  It explains Tbilisi’s behavior over the whole period under review, 
while also addressing an unavoidable element in in international relations, left 
out by most preceding analyses - the role of power in shaping foreign policy 
decision-making.  Following the conceptual argument will be several sections 
applying these insights to distinct periods in Georgian post-Soviet history.  
The paper will then turn to possible alternative, realist frameworks – Walt’s 
balance-of-threat theory and omnibalancing – that could provide competing 
explanations in a section, before concluding with implications for the present 
and future foreign policies of Georgia and other post-Soviet states. 
ENTER NEOCLASSICAL REALISM 
As mentioned above, part of the reason behind the prevailing preference for 
domestic explanations has been the apparent inability of most systemic, 
balance-of-power approaches to provide a coherent explanation for Tbilisi’s 
pro-Western foreign policies.  As also pointed out by Gvalia e.a. (2013), 
neorealism would have expected Georgia’s subsequent governments to 
bandwagon with, rather than balance against Russia.  The dominant response 
to these inconsistencies has been to disregard the inter-state level altogether, 
in favor of intra-state conditions.  But, apart from their failure to account for the 
emergence of pro-Western policies during the Shevardnadze era – before any 
regime change had taken place – these domestic explanations have 
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implausibly discounted the role of power in shaping policy.  Even the most 
ideologically inclined states could not disregard Thucydides’ (2015, 1) adage 
that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” .  
Under anarchic conditions, power shapes the permissive factors within which 
elites have to formulate foreign policy, and, over the longer term, states are 
either socialized into accepting this over-arching fact, or they pay a heavy 
price.  
 
Neoclassical realism addresses the shortcomings laid out above by combining 
the domestic and international, and maintaining realism’s sensitivity to power. 
For neoclassical realists, domestic conditions are not independent variables in 
and of themselves; foreign policies are, for instance, not explained based on 
the preferences of internal elites alone (Rose 1998).  Instead, the international 
system is integrated into explanations by viewing these elites as responding 
imperfectly (from the point of view of rationality) to given structural conditions.  
Balances of power so central to structural neorealism and its derivatives still 
matter, but are defectively transmitted into rational behavior: an elite’s 
ideological preferences and identities are one distorting factor in these 
imperfect transmission mechanisms (Sterling-Folker 2009).  Scholars in the 
neoclassical realist tradition also cite intra-state competition (Dueck 2009), the 
state’s varying ability to extract resources or mobilize societies towards policy 
(Taliaferro 2009; Zakaria 1998), and (mis)perceptions of the balance of power 
(Schweller 2004; Wohlforth 1993) as other possible intervening factors.  
Moreover, while the international system indeed tends towards rational 
outcomes over the longer term, specific situations require an understanding of 
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the intra-state processes that may produce ‘aberrant’ behavior over the 
shorter term, like, say, the unexpected balancing behavior of a small state 
against an overwhelmingly superior, adjacent great power. 
 
As, for instance, clearly demonstrated in Wohlforth’s (1987) discussion of 
perceptions of Russian power before World War I, it is not only perceptions of 
current balances that matter as intimations and calculations as to their future 
trajectories.  In that sense, states often end up bandwagoning with or 
balancing other states not simply because of present conditions, but because 
of speculative projections into the future.  Misperceptions and miscalculations 
consequently become quite regular occurrences, leading to behavior that, 
from a safe distance, may seem ‘irrational’ to a third-party observer wedded to 
structural explanations.  Wolhforth’s (1993) more expansive treatment of the 
role of perceptions during Cold War bipolarity moreover reveals how 
ideological shifts in both the United States and Soviet elites played a role in 
how they perceived the balances of power between them, resulting in several 
distinct periods of strategic behavior (and culminating in Gorbachev’s retreat 
from Central and Eastern Europe).  Ideology therefore does matter, mainly 
insofar as it helps (or hinders) an actor’s understanding of prevailing 
distributions of power – the ‘elusive balance’ - in the international system 
(Wohlforth 1993, 293-307). 
 
Adequately adapted, Wohlforth’s combination of the realist concern with the 
balance-of-power with the intra-state aspect of ideologically shaped 
perceptions provides a useful meeting point between two paradigms; it is this 
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general perspective – focusing on the interplay between ideology and power – 
which I shall build on here.  The main conceptual difference between his 
viewpoint and what follows will lie in Georgia’s status as a small state rather 
than a great power, and its consequent awareness of an inability to actively 
shape the global balance: after all, as also stated by Walt (1990, 28-31), what 
matters to a small state is not that global balance, but the balance as it relates 
to its immediate neighborhood, with the availability (or absence) of allies 
against given threats to that small state – most of which emerge in their 
immediate vicinity – determining its balancing or bandwagoning behavior.  In 
a world where interests are unevenly distributed and power is a finite resource 
(Wendt 1999, 103-38), the raw capabilities of potential allies become less 
important than their interest in a particular region, and an ensuing willingness 
to actually project such power into that region.  From a Georgian, and, more 
generally, a small-state perspective, the balance of power thus very much 
becomes a regional one, shaped not just by the aggregate capabilities of 
possible allies, but also their intentions and commitment to projecting their 
power into the region. 
 
Applying neoclassical realism to an analysis of Georgian foreign and security 
policies would thus require an assessment of the structural restraints under 
which the state operated, while at the same time looking into the internal 
processes and ideological preferences affecting perceptions of these 
structural restraints.  In terms of these structural constraints, the disparity of 
power between Tbilisi and Moscow posits an initial, overpowering limitation on 
the former (leading to the expectation of bandwagoning behavior on the part 
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of ‘purely systemic’ neo-realists): based on raw capabilities and proximity, 
Russia can very much be seen as the regionally preponderant power in the 
period under review.  But this disparity of power is to some extent alleviated 
through the varying presence of the West (first of all the United States) within 
the South Caucasus.  The balance of power in the South Caucasus could be 
seen to have varied during the past two decades, with Western - and 
particularly US - involvement and commitment arguably reaching a peak 
under George W. Bush, something eagerly perceived in Tbilisi during what 
can be termed the high point of pro-Western foreign policy, the presidency of 
Mikheil Saakashvili.2  
 
With the regional balance between Russia and the West so dependent on 
Washington and Brussels’ intentions, on their commitment to regional 
involvement, Wohlforth’s (1993) points on the ‘elusiveness’ of the balance of 
power become acutely relevant: perceptions of capabilities and commitments 
became a highly important intervening variable linking structural conditions – 
the balance of power – to foreign and security policy outputs, underlying 
Georgia’s decision to balance or bandwagon, enabling some options and 
foreclosing others. As I shall argue in the following sections, Georgian policies 
before and after the Rose Revolution were the result of perceptions of 
Russia’s relative regional decline, and (mis)calculations as to the West’s – 
especially the United States’ and NATO’s - readiness to project power into the 
South Caucasus – miscalculations that culminated dramatically in the August 
2008 war, which very much acted as a ‘perceptual shock’ (Rose 1998, 160) 
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invalidating many of the assumptions that had previously guided Georgia’s 
world-view.  
 
It is the structural environment – the regional balance of power - as perceived 
in Georgia that explains the pre-2003 pro-Western slant in Shevardnadze’s 
foreign and security policies, something left unaddressed by purely domestic 
ideological approaches.  Contra Gvalia et al. (2013), I shall argue that 
Saakashvili and his associates’ pro-Western ideologies were not significant in 
determining Georgia’s post-Soviet foreign and security policies on their own: 
clearly, something else had enabled Shevardnadze’s pre-revolutionary, much 
more conventionally post-Soviet administration drift towards the West: that 
crucial – and oft-forgotten - permissive cause was a perceived shift of power 
away from Russia.   
 
What was novel in the Saakashvili era was the reinforcement of these 
perceptions by ideologies that overstated the significance of liberal democracy 
in determining the regional balance of power through assumptions on the 
inevitable spread of democracy through the former Soviet space, and on the 
level of commitment of fellow Western democracies to Georgia; the external 
environment might not have substantially changed, but its mediation through 
the ‘transmission belt’ of domestic politics reinforced Georgia’s pro-Western 
orientation.  While the 2008 war acted as a ‘perceptual shock’ reasserting 
continuing Russian regional predominance, Saakashvili’s legitimacy had 
become so dependent on these ideologies (and so alienated from Russia) 
that any policy correction remained out of the question.  The new Georgian 
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Dream administration faces less restrictions in that regard, and its openings to 
Russia could be seen as the beginnings of further possible policy adjustments 
in the face of growing Russian assertiveness and perceived power, with much 
depending on the outcome of what is, essentially, a Western-Russian test of 
power in Ukraine.  
 
In the four empirical sections that follow, I shall argue my point with reference 
to primary and secondary sources, concentrating on the public discourses of 
Georgia’s leaders as they related to their perceptions of the regional balance 
of power in the South Caucasus, paying particular attention on their views on 
Washington’s intentions within the region, as well as Russia’s declining or 
improving fortunes.  In so doing, I will arrive at an explanation of Georgia’s 
foreign and security policy behavior encompassing 4 distinct periods: 
Shevardnadze’s early period (1992-96), marked by rapprochement with 
Russia after Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s disastrous (and short-lived) presidency; 
Shevardnadze’s late period (1996-2003), marked by an increasingly 
Westward-leaning policy; Saakashvili’s early period (2003-2008), marked by 
stridently pro-Western policies and strong corresponding ideological 
inclinations; and a late Saakashvili period, with pro-Western policies being 
maintained despite of the heavy defeat of the 2008 war.  Before concluding, a 
subsequent conceptual section will then expand on the advantages of this 
neoclassical realist view over any competing, more rigidly rationalist 
explanations. 
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COLLAPSE, DISORIENTATION, REORIENTATION (1992-1996) 
It would be difficult to overstate the unexpected nature of the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, especially for those living within the erstwhile superpower.  Having 
lost its Eastern European satellites in 1989, and in considerable turmoil by 
1991, the failed August coup precipitated a chain of events that would – 
through the Belavezha Accord and Alma Ata protocol – lead to the dissolution 
of this one-time superpower (Marples 2004, 91-97).  At the time, Georgia was 
led by an erratic (some would say ‘messianic’) and highly anti-Soviet 
president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia (Jones 1994); while his ideology and policies 
were, clearly, fiercely anti-Soviet, the Georgian state was in such chaos that 
there could be little talk of a coherent foreign and security policy, beyond the 
requirements of bare state and regime survival.  During and after the dying 
years of the USSR, Gamsakhurdia’s fierce ethno-nationalism was – according 
to most observers – instrumental in alienating the Republic’s various 
minorities – above all those in the autonomous territories of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia – from the idea of Georgian independence, driving them into 
the arms of Soviet, and, later, Russian irredentists (Nodia 1996).  
Gamsakhurdia’s authoritarian style eventually resulted in his estranging much 
of the country’s emerging political elite as well, resulting in a first of several 
civil wars during late 1991 (Way and Levitsky 2006, 397-400). 
 
As a result, Gamsakhurdia was forced to resign and flee shortly after the 
formal end of the Soviet state, on January 6, 1992; by that time, however, 
Georgia was already disintegrating, with large parts of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia coming under the control of secessionists, and central government 
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writ over much of Georgia’s remainder shaky at best.  In 1992-3, this 
disintegration deepened: having in effect lost the conflict in South Ossetia, 
Gamsakhurdia’s successor, Eduard Shevardnadze, was forced to sign a 
Russian-mediated cease-fire dividing the region into government- and 
separatist-controlled areas, and providing for a Russian-dominated joint police 
force (Caucasica.org 2008; MacFarlane 1997, 511-15).  Georgia’s humiliation 
culminated in its president’s hasty retreat – under enemy bombardment - of 
from Sukhumi, and a brief civil war in the western region of Megrelia 
(Cheterian 2008, 155-216); only in 1994 did the military situation in Abkhazia 
finally stabilize through the Moscow Agreement on a Cease-Fire and a 
Separation of Forces (United Nations 1994).  Thus, by mid-1994, almost 
exclusively Russian ‘peacekeepers’ or observers had been posted in both of 
Georgia’s separatist entities - formally at least - under CIS, OSCE and/or UN 
auspices (MacFarlane 1997).  As such, this ‘freezing’ of the conflicts in 
Georgia was nothing exceptional: the Karabakh war between neighboring 
Armenia and Azerbaijan was similarly brought to an end through an 
inconclusive cease-fire (not, however, involving the stationing of CIS or 
Russian troops in or around the enclave). 
 
To some degree, Moscow had also seemingly lost control over its own 
external and even internal policies during this chaotic early post-Soviet period.  
While the pro-Western foreign ministry, led by the liberal Andrei Kozyrev 
(1992, 10), wanted Russia to turn into a “normal great power” integrated with 
the West, elements within the security apparatus held onto traditional views of 
the country as a territorial power, with a clear sphere of interest that would 
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have to include the republics of the former Soviet Union, including Georgia.  
With much of the Soviet structures of authority in tatters, different sectional 
interests within the Russian state ended up applying contradictory policies, 
with the security forces in particular actively involved in conflicts on the former 
Soviet periphery, among others, through active assistance to secessionists in 
Abkhazia during the 1993 civil war (Chervonnaia 1994).  It was only during 
that year that the Russian Federation (2005) was able to formulate its first 
Foreign Policy Concept, which clearly delimited the territories of the former 
Soviet Union as Russia’s an area of special interest, and implied Moscow’s 
right to intervene in those former Soviet Republics where its interests were 
deemed to be under threat.  That same year also saw a partial resolution of 
the power struggle between Russia’s president and parliament in favor of the 
former, following the storming of the ‘White House’ in October 1993 
(Shevtsova 2000). 
 
Shevardnadze’s agreement to the cease-fire of 1994 (including nominally CIS, 
de-facto Russian ‘peacekeepers’), his introduction of Georgia into the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (which his predecessor had refused to 
join) in 1993/4, and his general submission to Russian foreign policy priorities 
during that period were the product of his recognition of continued Russian 
regional predominance, the fall of the USSR and a considerable weakening of 
the Russian state notwithstanding (Fawn 2002, 135-36).  Shevardnadze 
clearly saw any resolution in Abkhazia or South Ossetia outside of Russian 
tutelage as unworkable at that time, stating, during an interview in August that 
year, that “…in the Abkhaz issue today everything or almost everything will 
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depend on Russia” (BBC Monitoring 1994); his negotiator at the Geneva talks 
between Tbilisi and the Abkhaz separatists similarly cautioned that “…political 
forces which are demanding that the problem be solved militarily must 
realize…[that] the option they are proposing will only be possible if Russia 
takes a neutral position and refuses to be involved in the conflict" (BBC 
Monitoring 1994). 
 
Moscow had made its determination to maintain its sphere of influence over 
the former Soviet space clear, and, what’s more, the Georgian leadership 
could not expect any direct Western help in potential counter-balancing 
efforts: in Wilsonian fashion, the first Clinton administration had pinned its 
hopes on partnership and accommodation with a democratized (and, hence, 
pacified) Russia, rather than ‘hard’, power-political balancing in containing 
Moscow’s neo-imperial ambitions (Brzezinski 1994, 67-71), with NATO 
enlargement into the former Soviet Union - as opposed to Eastern Europe - 
not on the agenda.3 This would gradually change from 1996 onwards, but 
without the Western structural alternative, Shevardnadze could only rely on 
accommodation with Moscow, which he achieved to a limited extent and for a 
short time-period, in 1994-1995 (Nodia 1999, 23-24).  The overall tone of 
Georgian policymakers would become much more critical of Russia in later 
years, as negotiations over the secessionist territories dragged on (especially 
in the matter of refugees) and Shevardnadze became the target of several 
assassination attempts; for now, however, Georgia’s foreign policy behavior 
corresponded neatly to what would be expected under neo-realist analyses: 
small state Georgia was bandwagoning with the most important power in its 
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neighborhood, with domestic ideological preferences playing a minor role in 
its largely pragmatic policies towards Russia. 
DRIFTING TOWARDS THE WEST 
Tbilisi’s structural constraints would gradually change in subsequent years.  If, 
during much of its first term, the Clinton administration very much relied on his 
doctrine of ‘democratic expansion’ in bringing Moscow in from the cold, 
several events – including the 1997 Russian economic crisis, the Kremlin’s 
attitude towards NATO’s Eastward expansion, and the alliance’s 1999 
intervention in Kosovo – added to earlier disagreements over Chechnya to 
make the administration much more skeptical to such an approach (Frye 
2000).  The EU’s and NATO expansion into Russia’s ‘near abroad’ was still 
not on the agenda, but the West did start circumventing Russia in the 
economic field, most importantly through the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Çeyhan (BTC) pipeline skirting Russia: the ‘contract of the century’, signed 
with Azerbaijan in 1994, had already given Western corporations a foothold in 
the hydrocarbon-rich Caspian basin, apart from putting the region firmly on 
Western capitals’ geopolitical map.  The second Clinton administration in 
particular aimed at safeguarding access to these reserves through BTC, 
described by its interlocutors in Baku and Tbilisi as a very ‘political’ project, 
within which Georgia, as the only politically feasible transit country, would play 
a central role (Alam 2002; Hill 2004). 
 
These openings were eagerly taken up in Tbilisi – increasingly frustrated by 
the slow pace of negotiations with the secessionist entities, and what it saw as 
Russian prevarication during these negotiations, Georgian foreign policy 
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drifted further westward. Shevardnadze willingly agreed to the BTC pipeline; 
at the same time, he also gradually abandoned the hitherto cautious approach 
towards his large northern neighbor, all but accusing it of being involved in an 
assassination attempt in 1998(AFP 1998; Reeves 1998), demanding the 
withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia (before retracting his 
demand) (BBC Monitoring 2001; Lagnado 2002), strongly deploring the 
granting of Russian citizenship to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
populations (Prime News 2002; Rosnews 2002), rejecting ominous Russian 
accusations of Russian support for Chechen rebels (Antidze 2000; 
Dzhindzhikhashvili 2002), publicly advocating Georgian NATO membership 
(AFP 1999; NATO 2002; Silharulidze and Sysoyev 2000), and pressing for the 
closure of Russian bases in Georgia (BBC Monitoring 2000; BBC Monitoring 
2000; Dow Jones 2000) 
 
A second factor - the coming to power of George W. Bush and the neo-
conservatives in Washington – then dramatically accelerated Tbilisi’s 
westward drift by further changing its structural environment. Critical of 
Washington’s Eurasian policies during the Clinton years (Kristol and Kagan 
1996; Rice 2000), Republican policymakers were both willing and able to 
expand their involvement in the former Soviet space, especially in the months 
and years following the 9/11 attacks.  Much more sensitive to issues 
connected to energy, terrorism, and Iran, the new administration explicitly 
included Central Asia and the Caspian basin in its National Security Strategy 
(USA 2002, 24); the United States became directly, militarily involved in 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (Cornell 2005, 113), and explicitly 
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opened NATO membership to former Soviet states (Kralev 2002; Zaks 2003).  
The Bush administration was moreover open to addressing state weakness 
through an active involvement in state-building and democracy-promotion, of 
which Georgia would come to be a prime example (Monten 2005). 
 
At the same time, there was a perceived weakening of Russian influence in 
the region.  In the immediate aftermath of 9-11, Moscow became 
uncharacteristically accommodative of US involvement in ‘its’ near abroad 
(albeit for a short period, between 2001 and 2003), creating at least the 
impression, at the time, of a thaw between Washington and the Kremlin 
(Bukkvol 2003; Treisman 2002, 67-68), and a weakening of Russia’s 
commitment to controlling the South Caucasus (Fawn 2002).  While Russian 
power and assertiveness has today achieved something of a resurgence due 
to years of economic growth and political re-centralization during the previous 
decade, Moscow’s might was very much seen to be on the wane in the years 
following the 1997 economic crash.  The country was at an economic nadir 
after a failed economic revival, its armed forces were in disarray, its finances 
in dire straits.4 Putin’s centralizing reforms (aimed at restoring the ‘power 
vertical’) had not yet been pushed through, and other former Soviet republics 
were also seemingly leaving Moscow’s orbit: the now practically defunct 
GU(U)AM union - a grouping of strategically like-minded, Western-oriented 
former Soviet states (Allison 2004; Cornell 1999) - became particularly active 
during this period.  
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The new administration in Washington was more open to direct involvement in 
the former Soviet space, within which Georgia had acquired increased 
importance due to its status as a transit corridor for Caspian hydrocarbons, 
while Russia stood, apparently, weakened in both power and resolve.  It is 
this observed change in the balance of power and its ramifications for 
Georgia’s structural environment, rather than some kind of ideological shift, 
that enabled Shevardnadze’s (and the other GUUAM states’) cautious moves 
towards the West, which had become a clear alternative, especially in the 
aftermath of 9/11: the balance of power in the former Soviet space was 
shaped by Russia’s apparent decline and the Bush administration’s readiness 
to intervene where Clinton had initially feared to tread.  These shifting 
structural conditions fed into perceptions of these developments and power 
shifts in Tbilisi (and elsewhere) to produce Shevardnadze’s response.    
 
Ideology played a minor role in this process: it was not an unlikely sudden 
ideological conversion by Shevardnadze that affected Georgia’s westward 
shift in 1996-2003.  The educational and professional background of 
Georgia’s pragmatic second president – as a former General Secretary of the 
Georgian CP and the Soviet Union’s last foreign minister (Ekedahl and 
Goodman 1997, 7-28; Jones and Kakhishvili 2013, 38) – drove him towards a 
reliance on inter-elite bargaining and a corresponding focus on processes of 
high politics rather than ideological exigencies or assumptions on Georgian 
identity (save for the over-arching, unavoidable imperative of Georgia’s 
reunification).   The emergence of the pro-Western GU(U)AM grouping of 
states was similarly not predicated on ideology, but on pragmatic 
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considerations of similarly perceived shifting power politics within Russia’s 
near abroad.  But the question of Georgia’s orientation would come to be 
imbued with precisely such a forceful ideological component with the 
challenge to, and the final fall from power of Georgia’s second president.   
DREAMS OF DEMOCRACY AND REUNIFICATION (2003-2008) 
Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ was a seminal moment in the history of the 
former Soviet Union.  The first of several ‘color revolutions’ in the former 
Soviet space, it brought to power a group of young reformers – led by a 
triumvirate consisting of Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino Burzhanadze and Zurab 
Zhvania – with radically liberal, pro-Western policies. Faulting Shevardnadze 
for increased corruption and authoritarianism, and his failure to achieve the 
country’s reunification, they broke their links with the governing elite (of which 
they had previously been part) and finally succeeded in removing 
Shevardnadze from power through a non-violent uprising, in 2003 (Wheatley 
2005, 171-209).  While, in the beginning of the Rose Revolution, observers 
noted the absence of a clear agenda beyond criticism of the old regime’s 
perceived ineptitude and corruption (Broers 2005, 343), once in power, the 
“results-oriented” (Nodia 2005, 50) Saakashvili-Burzhanadze-Zhvania 
triumvirate came to coalesce around a number of clearly expressed goals, 
centered around the notion of liberal democracy and capitalism as superior, 
and inherently attractive modes of political and economic governance.  
Domestically, the reformers’ narratives implied a Georgia’s radical 
transformation from a weak, fractured, semi-authoritarian post-Soviet republic 
into a strong, united, multi-cultural, liberal-democratic, free-market state.  In 
terms of foreign and security policy, they led to an intensification of Georgia’s 
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westward lurch by confirming and escalating the country’s Atlanticist efforts 
towards NATO and EU membership – a process already begun, in a more 
cautious manner, under Shevardnadze.   
 
As pointed out above, rather than being novel, this pro-Western orientation 
constituted an element of continuity between the late Shevardnadze and early 
Saakashvili years; and this continuity affirms perceptions of the balance of 
power between Russia and the West, rather than ideology on its own, as an 
explanatory factor behind Tbilisi’s Euro-Atlantic strategy.  The period 
immediately preceding the Rose Revolution had been one where the West 
was very much seen as being in the ascendant, and Russia either in decline, 
or at least more accommodative to a greater American role in the former 
Soviet Union  (see above).   It was this, rather than the radically different 
ideological outlooks of Shevardnadze and Saakashvili, that underlay 
Georgia’s constant Atlanticist course from the end of the 1990s.  
Washington’s increased commitment to regional involvement – mostly through 
Georgia – upheld the West as a real alternative after the Revolution, and gave 
Tbilisi a sense of confidence it would never have had otherwise, leading them 
to challenge Russia through the expulsion of alleged Russian spy rings, the 
closure of Russian bases even in the face of Russian retaliation in the form of 
the ejection of Georgian nationals or the imposition of economic embargoes 
before the 2008 war.   
 
During this post-revolutionary period, Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation was 
written into its Security Concept, and underwritten by a stated ideological 
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espousal of ‘Western’ democratizing values through which the new regime 
came to define its very purpose, in difference to Shevardnadze’s much more 
under-stated, less ideologically laden discourse.  The United States expanded 
military co-operation with Tbilisi, increasing direct military aid, helping in the 
adoption of NATO standards, and actively pushing for Georgian membership 
within the Alliance (Lynch 2006, 51-54; Nichol 2007).  The country – and, 
specifically, Saakashvili’s government - was clearly defined by both 
policymakers and analysts alike as a major strategic priority (BBC 2005; 
Cooley and Mitchell 2009; Cornell 2007), prompting Russian foreign minister 
Sergei Lavrov to refer to its as America’s “pet project” (De Borchgrave 2008).  
Compared to NATO engagement, integration with the European Union – 
through programs like the ENP - remained a relatively lower priority at the 
time, in both Brussels and Tbilisi (Leonard and Grant 2005; MacFarlane 2008, 
6).  In the absence of a perceived regional commitment by the West, such 
acts would have been inconceivable, suicidal even: the balance, and 
perceptions thereof, provided a crucial permissive structural variable for such 
actions, and the more general orientation underlying them (BBC 2006; 
Republic of Georgia 2005; Ria Novosti 2006; Socor 2007). 
 
Ideology acted, at most, as an intervening variable.  It explained the increased 
intensity and explicitness of Georgia’s pro-Western strategies rather than the 
basic strategy in itself. And it reinforced perceptions of Western ascendancy 
and Russian decline, even in the face of the changing structural realities that 
made the Western/Russian balance of power far less straightforward than 
during the late Yeltsin/early Putin years.  The period between 2003 and 2008 
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was, after all, also one where Moscow regained much of its economic and 
political composure5, and one when - especially after the color revolutions - 
any talk of Russia being ‘receptive’ to Western involvement in the former 
Soviet Union ceased:  on the contrary, the Putin regime expressed its strong 
disquiet at an apparent loss of control over what it termed its “sphere of 
special interest”, and its strong disapproval of NATO membership for former 
Soviet states (Kishkovsky 2008; Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin 2008; VOA 
News 2007).  This Russian resurgence was counter-acted by the Bush 
administration’s increased readiness to deploy power in the former Soviet 
Union, but it made evaluating the levels of commitment by 
Washington/Brussels and Moscow all the more difficult.   
 
Rather than acting on its own, ideology ensured that perceptions of the 
relationships of power between the West and Russia in Tbilisi essentially 
remained in the former’s favor in an evolving, increasingly murky regional 
strategic environment: it produced positive feedback loops, boosting these 
perceptions of the preponderance of Western-style democracies, through two 
assumptions: that democracy’s spread throughout the former Soviet Union 
was inevitable, and that fellow democracies made particularly reliable allies 
against authoritarian states.  These assumptions had an inevitable effect on 
Tbilisi’s world-view, and its evaluation of its own, and the West’s capabilities 
and commitments: the first implied a historically determined retreat of 
autocratic Russia’s influence in the near abroad (or its transformation into a 
democracy), while the second encouraged Tbilisi to overstate the level of 
Western (and, particularly, American) commitment to its security.  The 
24		
distortive effect of these assumptions on Tbilisi’s perceptions of power would 
eventually contribute to the fateful miscalculations of August 2008. 
 
Firstly, Georgia’s policymakers – and, significantly considering the centralized, 
top-down nature of foreign policymaking in Georgia, its flamboyant president - 
came to regard the spread of democracy throughout the former Soviet Union 
as historically determined and inevitable. From the Borjomi declaration6 to 
everyday discourse, Saakashvili implied that the Rose Revolution was just the 
earliest in a new wave of democratization that would now sweep through the 
former Soviet Union, and even enable Georgia itself to coax its secessionist 
provinces back into the fold. The result would be either the democratization of 
Russia (and thus its neutralization as an imperial threat) or the creation of a 
ring of democratic states, duly supported by their democratic Western 
counterparts.  The similarity of such thinking with neo-conservative 
democratic domino theories regarding the Middle East cannot be denied; and 
it would not have been the first time that a deterministic belief shaped 
misperceptions on future events and their consequences for relationships for 
the balance of power.  In Georgia’s case, the notion that history was on 
democracy’s side also contributed to a skewed view of Russian weakness 
and Western ascendancy.  In Saakashvili’s words:  
 
We are now witnessing the second wave of liberation of Europe. 
(…) The first one was Second World War, I mean, defeat of 
fascists. (…) Second one were all those velvet revolutions in 
Eastern Europe.  But now the third one.   Georgia started 
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it.  Ukraine followed. Then Kyrgyzstan. So you are seeing that the 
results of Yalta are still there, but they are rapidly destroyed… 
(CNN 2005) 
 
The Saakashvili government’s narrative also implied that a pro-Western 
orientation would combine a buoyant free market economy and liberal-
democratic ‘good governance’ to lure both the Abkhaz and the Ossetians into 
Tbilisi’s fold: this idea was voiced frequently in the period running up to 2008, 
and boosted by the successful re-incorporation of semi-secessionist Ajaria in 
2004 (Republic of Georgia s.d.; Saakashvili 2008; Saakashvili 2004; 
Saakashvili 2004).   In effect, this implied confidence in the soft power of 
democracy appeared to play a central role in Tbilisi’s calculations; and it was, 
in fact, one of the reasons Saakashvili and his team saw challenging 
overwhelming Russian power in both territories as a realistic option.  Often 
speaking over the heads of the respective regional leaderships, Saakashvili 
apparently (and mistakenly) assumed an ability to appeal to local populations 
at a grassroots level, depriving the leaderships of the de-facto entities of 
legitimacy.  In the case of South Ossetia, this actually led to a high-profile 
defection from the secessionist elite, with the absconding of Dmitry 
Sanakoyev to Tbilisi’s side before the 2008 war (BBC Monitoring 2007; Corso 
2008; Corso and Owen 2006). 
 
Secondly, Georgia’s president expressed an ideologically informed adherence 
to the Democratic Peace on several occasions, observing its stark distinction 
between naturally dependable allies – peaceful fellow democracies – and 
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natural adversaries – inherently aggressive autocracies like Russia (Owen 
1994; Risse-Kappen 1995).  To quote Saakashvili:  
 
…when I see President Putin, I will remind him again that 
democracies on his border will make it easier for Russia to grow in 
a peaceful way.  Democracies are peaceful.  Democracies don't 
like war.  And democracies are the best form of government to deal 
with animosities and concerns (States News Service 2005). 
 
With Georgia seen as, at the very least, an aspiring member of the 
‘democratic community of states’, this tentatively raises the specter of Tbilisi 
relying disproportionately on shared ideology rather than cold power-political 
calculation in assessing the balance between the West – and particularly the 
United States – and Moscow.  Especially when one takes such a balance of 
power to depend both on raw capabilities and interests, such a belief – if 
sincerely held - would have distorted Saakashvili perceptions by in effect 
overestimating the West’s, and particularly the United States’ often and 
forcefully stated commitment to Georgia’s security.  A perspective untainted 
by the assumption of democratic solidarity would, no doubt, have provided a 
much more sobering view of the Georgian state’s own capabilities, and the 
West’s willingness to wield power in the ‘near abroad’ in defiance of Russia’s 
much greater commitment to do the same.   
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THE LATE SAAKASHVILI YEARS: WAR AND DISINTEGRATION 
By the beginning of 2008, the assumption that democracy would inexorably 
spread throughout the former Soviet Union had frayed beyond recognition: far 
from seeing the spread of democracy throughout the ‘near abroad’, those 
democratic experiments that followed the ‘color revolutions’ in Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan faltered.  Alongside economic dependence, regional divisions 
within the former presented ‘weak spots’ that were eagerly exploited by 
Russia in creating internal antagonisms and rolling back or stalling many of 
the reforms initially envisaged by Kyiv.  Kyrgyzstan’s revolution similarly 
remained precarious, failing to live up to its promises by degenerating into the 
corruption and repression of the Bakiyev regime.  Once pro-Western 
authoritarian states also re-adjusted their foreign policies towards a more 
cautious stance vis-à-vis Moscow: Uzbekistan left GU(U)AM outright in 2005, 
and Azerbaijan moved its ‘multi-vectoral’ policies closer to Russia, in effect 
beginning the organization’s decline into the empty shell it is today (Tudoroiu 
2007). 
 
By 2007, the ‘democratization’ experiment in Georgia itself also was in serious 
trouble (Mitchell 2009; Mitchell 2009).  Despite of having instituted a raft of 
reforms, Saakashvili and his entourage were, increasingly, being accused of 
authoritarian methods and high-level corruption by an increasingly vocal 
opposition.  The November 2007 riots in central Tbilisi showed the extent to 
which the road towards successful democratization would not be so smooth 
after all.  This weakened the logic of Saakashvili’s strategy considerably: far 
from being historically pre-determined, the spread of democracy revealed 
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itself to be quite reversible, at least within the specific historical and regional 
context of the former Soviet Union – the ‘ring of democratic states’ envisaged 
in the Borjomi declaration had not materialized.  Democracy’s powers-of-
attraction had, moreover, failed to coax Abkhazia and South Ossetia away 
from the Russian orbit, despite of Tbilisi’s very active public diplomacy in 
preceding years.    
 
The one democratic assumption left standing was that regarding the 
commitment of fellow democracies to (at least aspiringly) democratic 
Georgia’s defense.  Western financial and military aid, and American 
professions of a commitment to Georgia’s security had, in previous years, 
made direct challenges to Russian regional power possible.  NATO’s refusal 
to grant Georgia a Membership Action Plan in April 2008 – despite of 
extensive lobbying by Washington – thus came as a source of great 
disappointment to Tbilisi, all the more so because the unresolved nature of 
Georgia’s secessionist conflicts was put forward as one of the reasons for the 
refusal (BBC Monitoring 2008; Gallis 2008, 3-6).  This shock was largely 
counter-acted by Washington’s (and “New Europe’s”) continued expressions 
of support for Tbilisi and its NATO aspirations (DPA 2008; Poland Business 
Weekly 2008; Russia & CIS Military Weekly 2008): much has been made of 
the United States’ ‘mixed messages’ in the run-up to the war, designed to 
simultaneously reign in and reassure an increasingly beleaguered ally, but 
taken by many to have been erroneously interpreted by Tbilisi as a strong 
commitment of support in the face of Russia’s ongoing provocations in South 
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Ossetia (BBC Monitoring 2008; Bowker 2011, 204-05; Cheterian 2010, 73-74; 
Cooper and Shanker 2008). 
 
The Georgian military operation in South Ossetia in August that year 
emerged, at least partly, from these democratically inspired miscalculations: 
most importantly, the misguided belief that Western democracies’ – especially 
American – assurances of support for Tbilisi would outmatch Moscow’s 
determination to maintain strategic control over the South Caucasus.   This is 
not the place to analyze the immediate reasons for the 2008 war at length; it 
is, however, safe to argue that it was not ideologically motivated, beyond the 
over-arching requirement, held by all Georgian administrations since 
Gamsakhurdia of re-uniting the country: most of the ideological assumptions 
guiding Saakashvili since 2003 had been comprehensively contradicted by 
the time he gave the orders for Georgian troops to move against Tskhinvali.   
Instead, Tbilisi’s perception of present and future structural conditions limited 
its margin of maneuver, and drove it towards taking drastic action. 
 
Firstly, NATO membership – the ultimate guarantee of security for the 
Georgian state, and, thus, a major incentive for action - was blocked by the 
continued insistence by several European states on a resolution of the 
Abkhaz and Ossetian conflicts; with an assertive Russia piling on the 
pressure, Tbilisi did not have any reasonable prospect of resolving these 
issues peacefully or in good time.  Secondly, Georgia’s strategy thus hinged, 
increasingly precariously, on continued support from Washington, and 
imminent presidential elections made American support even less reliable 
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over the longer term, as it was far from clear whether a new administration 
would be as committed to projecting power into Russia’s ‘sphere of special 
interest’ as its predecessor. These pressures were moreover exacerbated by 
Kosovo’s secession from Serbia, a worrying precedent for Tbilisi (Antonenko 
2008; Tuathail 2008).  A structural window of opportunity was therefore rapidly 
closing:  with the pressure on, and the clock ticking, Saakashvili thus chose to 
take his (fatal) August gamble, while US commitments were still perceived to 
be acute, and therefore relevant to Tbilisi’s calculations of power in its 
immediate environment. 
 
Considering the enormous disparities of power between Russia and Georgia, 
it is highly unlikely Tbilisi would have adopted such a high-risk strategy in 
response to Russian provocations without these above-mentioned 
misperceptions regarding the balance-of-power, and the narrowing structural 
constraints marking its environment.  But in the end, when push came to 
shove, the United States (and Europe) limited themselves to symbolic 
gestures, diplomatic interventions, and longer-term aid (Nichol 2009, 17-37); 
contrary to what Saakashvili may have thought, higher-level interests won out 
over previously loudly proclaimed ‘democratic solidarity’ in Georgian-Western 
interaction during and following the war, making the Western response feeble, 
at best (Antonenko 2008, 29-34).   
 
Europe, for its part, was split (Mouritzen and Wivel 2013, 113-38; Parmentier 
2009).  Hawks, including the UK and Eastern European states, argued for 
sanctions against Russia - with several heads of state demonstratively visiting 
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Tbilisi during the war - and called for an acceleration of Georgia’s path 
towards NATO membership.  Doves – including Germany and others in 
Rumsfeld’s ‘Old Europe’ – took a more cautious line, stressing the necessity 
for continued engagement with Moscow, with Berlusconi’s Italy even taking an 
openly pro-Russian stance.  In the end, the European Union’s role remained 
limited to that of a mediator (Cornell and Starr 2009, 111-15; Mouritzen and 
Wivel 2013, 139-56), with France’s president, Sarkozy, eventually succeeding 
in negotiating a cease-fire between Moscow and Tbilisi after several weeks of 
intense shuttle diplomacy.  Europe would continue its engagement in Georgia, 
and include it in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) – an upgraded version of the 
European Neighborhood Policy – in subsequent years (EU External Action 
Service 2015), but in military-strategic terms, its behavior during the 2008 war 
could not be termed that of an ‘ally’. 
 
Georgia’s main alliance was still with the United States, however, and here, 
again, Tbilisi would remain disappointed despite of both sides’ considerable 
investments into a ‘strong personalized’ bilateral relationship in previous years 
(Cooley and Mitchell 2009; Mouritzen and Wivel 2013, 97-112).  Washington 
was slow to react at first, and direct military action in Georgia’s favor remained 
out of the question throughout the conflict despite calls by some hawks within 
the administration – notably vice president Dick Cheney – for “Russian 
aggression” not to go unanswered (Downing 2008; Nichol 2009, 23-27): while 
American policymakers did intensify their verbal criticisms of Russia as the 
conflict dragged on, apart from a largely symbolic dispatch of a war ship 
delivering humanitarian supplies to Georgian waters, and the flying home of 
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Georgian servicemen serving in Iraq very little was offered in terms of 
immediate military aid.  Saakashvili’s final assumption - on the level of 
commitment by the United States (and the broader West) to much-lauded 
‘fellow democracy’ Georgia – now also lay in tatters.  The ‘guns of August’ 
invalidated much of Saakashvili’s approach, and left the Republic’s foreign 
and security policies in a state of limbo, continuing as if by (ideological) 
inertia. 
 
The August 2008 war should thus have acted as a ‘perceptual shock’ to 
Tbilisi, doing away with many of the ideological assumptions and 
demonstrating, beyond any doubt, both Russia’s capabilities and commitment 
to a continued presence in the South Caucasus, and, conversely, the relative 
lack of commitment of the West to directly and forcefully challenging that 
presence.  With the politically very different Obama administration also 
pursuing a more realist policy, aiming at an ever-elusive ‘reset’ with Russia 
rather than the expansion of NATO as a ‘zone of democratic peace’, Tbilisi 
was now confronted with a very different geopolitical environment, one which 
its extensive, final-hope lobbying efforts in Washington could not counteract 
(Kagan 2010; Rachwald 2011; Silverstein 2011).  The world’s only 
superpower had demoted its onetime ‘pet project’; and although Georgia 
continued to receive Western aid (of a largely non-military nature, in contrast 
to what had happened in previous years), and became in active participant in 
the EU’s Eastern Partnership, talk of actual NATO and EU membership 
became ‘academic’ at best (Bowker 2011). 
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The important question here is why, in light of the disastrous August 2008 
war, the Saakashvili government continued with its pro-Western policies in 
spite of these fundamental structural changes.  If, as argued above, its 
previous pro-Western strategic choice was premised on a perception of 
(present or future) Western superiority and commitment amplified by ideology, 
and both that perception and its supporting ideologies were now in serious 
question, Georgia would have to change course, and either bandwagon with, 
or at the very least sit on the fence while the power relationships between 
East and West were clarified.   
 
But Georgia’s pro-Western policies continued unabated (Arnoult 2014; 
Rondeli 2012):  with neither NATO or EU membership a realistic prospect 
even over the medium term, this gave the impression of Georgian foreign and 
security policies being in denial, tilting Westwards even as the strategic 
commitment of the West to the country had diminished relative to the George 
W. Bush years, and even as a pro-Western orientation could not provide a 
road-map towards re-unifying the country.  It is highly unlikely that the 
Saakashvili camp failed to understand the modified geopolitical context 
surrounding it.  Then why did it not respond in the manner that structural 
realists, or even neoclassical realists considering perceptions of power would 
expect it to? 
 
Above all, Georgia was restrained at the inter-state level by Russia’s 
opposition to improved relations in the absence of regime change: any 
improvement in relations would require the departure of Saakashvili himself 
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(BBC Monitoring 2009; Ria Novosti 2011; Ukraine General Newswire 2010).   
In any case, with its position in the now-recognized secessionist territories 
secured, Russia did not have much incentive in throwing the Saakashvili 
regime a lifeline by softening its pressure (through a loosening of the 
economic blockade, for instance).  Georgia in effect acknowledged the 
hopeless nature of its relations with Moscow through, among others, its 2010 
National Security Concept (Republic of Georgia 2010), which, contrary to its 
more subdued and cautious 2006 predecessor, was frank and open about the 
perceived menace from Russia, identifying it as its main existential threat.  
Georgia’s government was structurally trapped in its pro-Western policies, 
with no realistic prospect for rapprochement with Moscow in the absence of 
regime change.   
 
But ideology also had a role to play in Tbilisi’s inert policies towards its 
northern neighbor.  While well aware that regional power balances had now 
moved in Russia’s favor, Georgia’s elite also did not have a choice because of 
their domestic identification with ideologies they had espoused for years 
beforehand: a recalibration of policies towards Russia would have required 
such a fundamental restatement of the regime’s legitimizing parameters – 
both at home and abroad - as to be impracticable without a significant loss of 
social capital.  In effect, it would have entailed an admission of strategic 
failure and of the very raison d’être of their regime: the Rose Revolution.  
Thus, just as ideology had amplified distortions in Tbilisi’s perceptions of the 
balance of power in the past, it now served to limit its elite’s margin for 
maneuver in response to a different regional-international environment.   
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To some extent, Saakashvili had become a victim of his own success in 
changing the Georgian political discourse: domestically, “Saakashvili and his 
lieutenants found that they had imprisoned themselves in a box of democratic 
rules” (Fairbanks and Gugushvili 2013, 121), while public support for NATO 
and EU membership - having only slightly declined in the years following 2008 
- was still overwhelming (Navarro and Woodward 2012). Indeed, one often-
heard accusation referred to his mishandling of Georgia’s Western course 
through corruption, authoritarianism, and an unnecessarily confrontational 
attitude towards Russia, mistakes that the new Georgian Dream coalition – 
centered on billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili – pledged to correct (Civil Georgia 
2011; Gente 2013, 124-5).  Tbilisi’s policies were in deadlock, both at the 
international and the domestic level: its assumptions on the balance of power 
– specifically the level of commitment by its Western allies - had been 
contradicted, while domestic ideological imperatives precluded any corrective 
action.  It would take the election of Georgian dream, in 2012, for the country 
to move, ever so slightly, beyond this impasse. 
THE BALANCE STRIKES BACK 
The discussion in the previous sections reveals the a priori dismissal of 
power-based explanations by those wedded to solely domestic explanations 
as premature.  While ideology did undoubtedly play a role in the formation of 
Tbilisi’s foreign policies (and most decisively so during the Saakashvili 
period), ignoring the power-political context in decision-making over the whole 
period under review – as the purely Innenpolitik approaches like Tsygankov 
and Tarver-Wahlquist’s (2009), or Gvalia, Siroky, Lebanidze and Iashvili’s 
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(2013) do - is simply implausible.  Georgian elites did not just care about their 
ideological goals, they had to realize those goals in an international 
environment whose changing power-political relationships opened up certain 
possibilities and foreclosed others.  Focusing in the interactions between 
these power-political realities and the ideologically shaped perceptions of 
these realities – as neoclassical realism does – leads to explanations that are 
superior to solely domestic approaches in coherently capturing a greater 
number of phenomena over a longer period in time, in a clear indication of 
superior validity.  The combining of ideology and power also proves superior 
to competing structural-rationalist approaches: they too are only able to 
account for distinct periods of Georgian foreign policy, outside of which they 
would have to dismiss Tbilisi’s behavior as ‘irrational’. 
  
Take, for instance, two such derivatives of Waltzian neorealism which could 
be seen as relevant to the Georgian case: Walt’s (1990) balance-of-threat 
theory and David’s (1991) ‘omnibalancing’ framework.   Against other 
structural forms of balance-of-power realism, the first actually sees 
bandwagoning by states as the exception rather than the rule, especially in 
the presence of perceived threats (as Russia was to Georgia for most of the 
post-Cold War period); the second sees the elites of fragile states like Georgia 
engaged in a balance-of-power game at two levels – the domestic and the 
international – with domestic threats to their continued hold on power 
determining their international alignments: in this view, Shevardnadze’s and 
Saakashvili’s strategic alignments would thus be predicated on their over-
arching imperative of warding off domestic threats.  On closer examination, 
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however, neither of these theories provides an explanation that is as 
comprehensive and coherent as their neoclassical realist counterpart – 
precisely because of the latter’s ability to account for what would be construed 
as prima-facie ‘irrational’ behavior under these two alternatives. 
 
Walt’s balance-of-threat theory is, at best, ambiguous and partial in its 
application to the Georgian case.  On the one hand, it refines Waltz’ 
framework to argue that a state’s choice between balancing against or 
bandwagoning with a threat is shaped by a number of interrelated factors, 
including that potential threat’s aggregate power, its geographic proximity, its 
offensive power, its aggressive intentions, and the availability of allies, all of 
which favor balancing rather than bandwagoning behavior (Walt 1990, 17-29).  
On the other hand, there is an important restriction for ‘weaker’ – that is, 
small, less powerful - states like Georgia, which, as Walt (1990, 29-30) states, 
“…will be tempted to bandwagon when threatened by a great power 
[emphasis added]”, and are especially sensitive to “geographically proximate” 
threats.  Such ‘weak’ states will accommodate a threatening power because 
“they will be the first victims of expansion, because they lack the capabilities 
to stand alone, and a defensive alliance may operate too slowly to do them 
much good” (Walt 1991, 31). 
 
As argued above, quite against what Walt would expect from a small state 
confronting an adjacent great power, Georgia’s behavior since independence 
has mostly consisted of balancing Russia, except for a short period during the 
first years of the Shevardnadze presidency; and Tbilisi’s balancing behavior 
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was at its most intense during the Saakashvili years, when Russia’s 
aggregate and offensive power was increasing under Vladimir Putin’s oil-
fuelled drive to ‘restore the power vertical’.  Georgia’s initial balancing 
behavior could have been explained by the availability of new allies: with 
NATO eastward expansion and increased US involvement in the former 
Soviet Union, a Euro-Atlantic orientation became a viable option for Georgia 
from the later years of the Shevardnadze presidency.  But in the end, this pro-
NATO orientation led to the very consequences posited by Walt for ‘aberrant’ 
behavior by smaller states (Walt 1990, 31): Georgia became the first victim of 
Russian expansionism, it obviously lacked the capabilities to stand alone, and 
the NATO alliance did operate too slowly (and half-heartedly) to do it much 
good, failing the ‘balancing’ test when it should have been at its most relevant 
– during war.  Walt’s rationalist framework thus succeeds in explaining 
Shevardnadze’s initial bandwagoning and subsequent balancing behavior vis-
à-vis Russia.  Saakashvili’s behavior would, however, have to be 
characterized as a major miscalculation; and such miscalculations sit more 
comfortably within neoclassical realism’s – particularly, Wohlforth’s – focus on 
perceptions and misperceptions of the elusive balance of power7. 
 
Neither can Tbilisi’s foreign policy be coherently and continuously explained 
through omnibalancing’s combination of the internal and external power-
calculus of rational statesmen in ‘fragile’ – i.e. weakly institutionalized - states.  
For David, the leaders of fragile states – as Georgia arguably was in the 
1990s – have to play the balance-of-power at two-levels, the domestic and the 
systemic (David 1991, 233-34).  System-level behavior is often dependent on 
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calculations at the domestic level, as governments use alliances to counteract 
threats to regime stability.  Applied to Georgia, this would mean that 
subsequent governments’ alliances with Russia or the West depended on 
incumbent regimes’ commitment to maintaining domestic power.  
Shevardnadze’s alignment with Russia in his earlier years could thus be quite 
plausibly explicated through the “still-born” nature of the Georgian state 
(Demetriou 1999, 866-73), and the ensuing necessity to defuse armed 
separatist conflicts and acute threats to his hold on power in Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia and Megrelia.  But other aspects of Tbilisi’s behavior since 1992 don’t 
readily fit into this framework, most importantly because of the conditionalities 
associated with Euro-Atlantic integration. 
 
Indeed, Omnibalancing assumes that a fragile state’s foreign policy is 
dependent on the governing elite’s over-arching interest in retaining power 
(David 1991, 235-38); but prospective NATO and EU membership – which 
stood at the core of Georgian foreign policy, certainly after the Rose 
Revolution – would definitely not have offered any such guarantees to an 
incumbent regime.  Unlike alliances between the West and developing states 
(where democratic norms are often inconsistently applied), the kind of full 
Euro-Atlantic integration sought by Tbilisi implied membership of a democratic 
‘security community’, and would thus have removed any guarantees on the 
continued hold on power by a specific elite (Pop-Eleches 2007; 
Schimmelfennig 2007). While Shevardnadze and Saakashvili’s democratic 
credentials were certainly flawed, whether they had the ruthlessness of the 
presidents-for-life usually associated with the omnibalancing framework can 
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certainly be questioned.  More importantly, unlike the various fully 
authoritarian regimes onto which omnibalancing has been applied (e.g. David 
1991, 245-51; O'Reilly 1998; Strakes 2011), they would have been aware that 
their foreign policy course would imply them giving up power and some point; 
in fact, when they did lose power, both did so in no small measure because of 
pressure from the very allies they had become so dependent on (Sindelar 
2012; Welt 2010, 178-87).   
 
While domestic explanations leave out considerations of power altogether, 
both balance-of-threat theory and omnibalancing at least acknowledge its 
importance in the calculations of small-state elites.  For Walt, assessments as 
to the relative power between rivaling alliances determine small states’ choice 
between bandwagoning with and balancing against external threats.  
Omnibalancing similarly implies an assessment by elites of the power-political 
implications of any possible alliances, this time against threats to regime 
survival.  But all explanatory frameworks hitherto expounded fail to 
continuously account for Georgia’s post-Cold War behavior: like their 
domestic counterparts, rigidly structural alternatives have to dismiss certain 
periods of behavior that fall outside their frameworks as ‘irrational’.  
Neoclassical realism’s advantage is that it can continuously account for a 
broader range of phenomena – especially the noncircumventable issue of 
power - and transitions between distinct periods of Georgian policy, without 
having to dismiss certain periods of behavior as falling outside its scope.  Its 
power lies in acknowledging the oft-discussed ‘elusiveness’ of the balance of 
power through the uncertainties of ideologically conditioned perception: and 
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this perspective is poised to offer new insights on the foreign policy behavior 
of not just Georgia, but other small states, both inside and outside the former 
Soviet Union, in the present and in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
With the October 2012 parliamentary elections, and, subsequently, the 
October 2013 presidential polls, regime change did occur in Georgia; and this 
allowed the new ‘Georgian Dream’ (GD) government to ‘correct’ the country’s 
foreign policies to reflect the far less straightforward power relationships in the 
former Soviet Union.  Two important shifts in policy thinking could already be 
detected in the early months of the new administration: on the one hand, 
Ivanishvili and his party vowed to adjust the anti-Russian course of his 
president, supplementing (but not abandoning) Georgia’s policy of EU and 
NATO membership – a long-standing policy priority – with improved relations 
with Moscow through the decoupling of security, economic, and social issues 
(Civil Georgia 2012; Coalson 2012; MacFarlane 2015, 12).  At the same time, 
Ivanishvili’s administration also adopted more open policies towards the 
secessionist units, which were isolated as agents of Moscow in the latter, 
post-2008 years of a Saakashvili administration clearly having given up on 
public diplomacy and engagement (Menabde 2013).  This was not a return to 
Saakashvili’s earlier belief in democracy as strategy – rather than just rely on 
assumed effects of democracy and democratization, it appeared GD was also 
maintaining the possibility of some kind of pragmatic accommodation between 
Tbilisi and Moscow, while adhering to the aim of Georgia’s re-unification over 
the very long term (a strategic goal no Georgian politician could conceivably 
abandon in view of domestic public opinion). 
42		
 
This re-adjustment of policies should not be overstated: the Georgian 
government has on several occasions repeated its commitment to a pro-
Western course, including NATO integration and active participation in the 
EaP.  But regular dialogue with the Kremlin has nevertheless resulted in 
several tangible results: among others, a tentative lifting of the trade embargo 
and the resumption of regular flights between the countries in 2014 (ITAR-
TASS 2014; Menabde 2014).  The careful overtures to Russia could be seen 
as a reaction to shifting perceptions of the balance of power, perfectly 
explicable through the insights of neoclassical realism: compared to 2003, 
that balance was far less clear-cut, with the West’s commitment to the Newly 
Independent States in question (certainly compared to the days of the George 
W. Bush administration) (Birnbaum 2015).   Maintaining an opening, however 
small, towards Russia – in a ‘just in case’ hedging strategy (Tessman 2012)  – 
reflected Georgia’s now far more uncertain structural environment. 
 
How this ‘opening’ develops in the future depends on several factors – above 
all, the perceived balance of power between the West and Russia in the near 
abroad.  Two factors are significant in that sense.  Firstly, unlike during the 
years following the Rose Revolution, a pro-Western course, while clearly and 
forcefully stated, is not at the ideological heart of the current Georgian regime 
to the same extent as during the Saakashvili/UNM years; the current 
government is more pragmatic than its predecessor in that sense, something 
also recognized by Moscow (RIA Novosti 2013).  Secondly, and more 
importantly, as in previous years, the level of commitment by the West to 
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power-projection into Russia’s ‘near abroad’ will remain decisive in shaping 
perceptions of the relative power relationships between Brussels/Washington 
and Moscow.  This perceived commitment by the West to Georgia has been 
marked by mixed signals in recent months and years: despite new military aid 
packages, formal NATO membership remains elusive as ever for Tbilisi, and 
the Association Agreements related to the EaP carry no promise of the 
ultimate prize for any ‘Europeanizing’ country: actual entry into the EU (BBC 
Monitoring 2014; GHN New Agency 2014).  Opinion polls taken at the height 
of the Ukraine crisis show decreasing support within the Georgian public on 
NATO and the EU (Civil Georgia 2014; Navarro 2014), and a further, more 
significant shift in that direction would provide any Georgian pragmatist 
playing a two-level foreign-policy game with added possibilities to move 
towards Moscow. 
 
In this context, the ongoing Ukraine crisis could prove crucial in clarifying the 
relationships of power between East and West in the former Soviet Union, 
with inevitable consequences for the foreign policies of all smaller states in 
the region.  A ‘loss’ of Ukraine by the West through a perceived lack of 
commitment would shift the perceived balance in Russia’s favor, making pro-
Western policies far less tenable in Georgia than they have been up to this 
date; current openings to Russia would then come into their own as bases for 
further accommodation, or even bandwagoning.  While Ukraine and Georgia 
have been able to sign their respective Association Agreements with the EU 
(BBC 2014), the cost the former will pay in maintaining its Westward course, 
and the West’s determination to consistently push through its Eastern 
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program will be crucial in shaping perceptions of the future balance of power 
between East and West; and that balance, and perceptions thereof will be as 
important in shaping the attitude of the Newly Independent States towards the 
powers competing within their region as an isolated ideological commitment to 
democratic values.   
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NOTES 	
1 Thus, although Shevardnadze was more cautious than Saakashvili in 
expressing his views on NATO membership - seeing it as a longer-term 
aspiration rather than an immediate goal - he was already pushing for the 
expansion of military links to the United States under a ‘Train and Equip’ 
program, and threatening not to renew the mandate of Russian peacekeeping 
troops in the breakaway territories, in addition to demanding the closure of 
Russian military bases, over which agreement in principle was actually 
reached as early as in 2000.  Writing in 2002, one prominent analyst 
described Georgia as “decidedly and sometimes desperately pro-Western” 
(Baev 2002); by mid-2003 Shevardnadze was already unambiguously 
referring to NATO integration as guaranteeing Georgia’s independence (BBC 
Monitoring 2003; Interfax 2003).   
2 Especially after the re-election of Bill Clinton in 1996, Washington increased 
its activities in that region, at first in the economic, and, under George W. 
Bush, in the military spheres as well. The decision to build the strategically 
important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline was taken during Clinton’s second 
term (Hill 2004); George W. Bush had already intensified American 
involvement in Georgia under Shevardnadze, through the stationing of 
advisers in the Pankisi gorge and the GTEP ‘Train and Equip’ program before 
Tbilisi’s decisive Westward turn following the Rose Revolution.  The European 
Union also included Georgia within its European Neighborhood Policy, and, 
after 2009, the Eastern Partnership, leading to the signing of an Association 
Agreement in June 2014. (Arashidze 2002; Blagov 2003). 
71		
	
3 The Clinton administration at first concentrated on expanding NATO into 
Central and Eastern Europe; while the possibility of Russia and other former 
Soviet Republics joining was always kept open, the Partnership for Peace and 
Atlantic Council frameworks were, in part, designed to supplement repeated 
Clinton’s reassurances that any such expansion would take into account 
Moscow’s strategic interests (Clinton 2000; Goldgeier 1998). 
4 For contemporaneous pessimistic views of Russia see Lieven (1999), Trenin 
(2002) and Lynch (2001). 
5 The Russian economy had grown by between 4.7 and 10% per annum 
between 1999 and 2008, Vladimir Putin largely succeeded in restoring 
Russia’s power vertical, and, despite defective reform, the budgets for the 
country’s armed forces and power ministries increased substantially (Cooper 
2007; De Angelis 2008; Mitin 2008; World Bank 2014). 
6  A short-lived attempt by Georgia and Ukraine to create a ‘Community of 
Democratic Choice’ in the former Soviet space (CEPS 2005; Socor 2005). 
7 In switching his strategic orientation towards the West, Shevardnadze could 
also have been seen as ‘bandwagoning for profit’ by, in Schweller’s terms 
(1994, 96-98) ‘joining a wave of the future’ – the relative rise of the West - in 
order to realize the supreme objective of re-unifying the country.  One could 
even argue that Saakashvili’s belief in the inevitable spread of democracy 
intensified this logic.  But the 2008 war – and its associated costs - would 
stand as a major counterargument and discontinuity in this logic: the fact that 
bandwagoning continued could no longer be explained through a profit 
motive. 
